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Abstract 
This paper explores the determinants of people’s decisions to take 401(k) loans. We argue that 
401(k) plans do not simply represent retirement saving, but they also provide a means of saving 
for precautionary purposes. We model factors that rationally would induce people to borrow 
from their pension plans, and we explain why people do not often use 401(k) loans to replace 
their more expensive credit card debt. Next we test our hypotheses using a rich dataset and show 
that people who are liquidity-constrained are more likely to have plan loans, while the better-off 
take larger loans when they do borrow. Plan characteristics such as the number of loans allowed 
also influence borrowing and loan size in interesting ways, while loan interest rates have only a 
small impact. 
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Borrowing from Yourself:  
The Determinants of 401(k) Loan Patterns 
 
More than 62 million US private sector workers are covered by defined contribution (DC) 
plans, and these plans hold over $2.8 trillion in assets (U.S. Dept. of Labor 2007). A majority of 
these plans permit participants to take a loan from their plans: for instance, 85% of all 
participants were in plans that offered loans in 2006 (Vanderhei and Holden 2007). Plan loans 
allow participants to tap into their savings before retirement. By law, participants may borrow up 
to half their account balance, currently capped at $50,000. They do not need to pay income tax or 
other penalties as long as they repay on time, and the interest goes to their own accounts. But if a 
loan taker leaves his job, he is required to pay back all of the remaining loan balance within 60 
days. If he fails to do so, the loan is considered to have defaulted, and he must pay income tax 
plus a 10% penalty tax on the balance outstanding. Furthermore, those who borrow from their 
401(k)s may end up contributing less to their pension accounts after taking the loans, which 
could reduce their retirement account balances in the long run. With the recent economic 
downturn, there are also concerns that 401(k) loans might be climbing due to participants’ 
inability to obtain other forms of credit. For all of these reasons, plan sponsors and policymakers 
have expressed increasing interest in learning whether 401(k) loans are sensible in the pension 
context. 
In this research, we explore the factors that affect peoples’ decisions to take 401(k) loans. 
We construct a two-period utility maximization model to compare borrowing from 401(k) 
accounts and from credit cards. We predict that lower 401(k) loan interest rates, lower expected 




make taking 401(k) loans more appealing. We also discuss a puzzle identified by Li and Smith 
(2008) that people do not use 401(k) loans to pay off more expensive credit card debts.  
We then investigate the empirical determinants of borrowing from 401(k) pension plans. 
In particular, we assess how employee and plan characteristics affect the propensity to take these 
loans, and how large the loans are when people take them. First, we find that people who are 
liquidity-constrained are more likely to have 401(k) loans, but conditional on borrowing, the 
less-liquidity constrained take larger loans. We also find an inverted U-shape by age for plan 
borrowing and loan size. If the plan sponsor permits workers to take more loans, this boosts the 
probability of plan borrowing and loan size, but higher interest rates deter borrowing. These 
patterns are consistent with our model’s predictions and other empirical findings. 
In what follows, we first review previous literature. Next we lay out a utility-
maximization model where taking 401(k) loans is an option. Subsequently, we introduce our 
dataset and draw out hypotheses for the determinants of 401(k) borrowing. We then show how 
demographic and plan characteristics affect loan probabilities and link these findings to our 
hypotheses, followed by an assessment of loan amounts. We close with a brief conclusion.  
 
Related Studies 
Previous research has mostly focused on the impact of pension plan design on participant 
behavior. Using a sample of 401(k) plans administered by Vanguard, Mitchell, Utkus and Yang 
(2005) found that higher employer match rates enhance participation rates of lower-paid 
employees, but they do not increase saving rates very much. Using a smaller sample of plans 
provided by Hewitt Associates, Madrian and Shea (2001) found that automatic enrollment 





enrollment stays with the default contribution rate and default fund allocation.1 Nevertheless, few 
studies have examined the reasons that plan sponsors elect particular plan design features, and 
fewer still investigate whether providing loans enhances employee participation and contribution 
rates. Using cross-sectional firm-level data, the General Accounting Office (GAO 1997) reported 
that participation rates were 6 percent higher in plans that offer loans compared to plans without 
loan provisions. That study also noted that average annual participant contributions were 35 
percent higher in plans with loan provisions than in others. In a much larger study of Vanguard-
administered plans, Mitchell, Utkus and Yang (2007) showed that having a loan provision raises 
contribution rates by about 10 percent.  Participant-level data were also examined by Munnell, 
Sunden and Taylor (2000) and Holden and Vanderhei (2001), who reported that contribution 
rates were slightly positively associated with having plan loans. 
 The literature has been relatively silent on the question of who takes loans from their 
pension plans and what drives this behavior. Vanderhei and Holden (2007) offered descriptive 
statistics on 401(k) borrowers. Sunden and Surette (2000) reported that people who accumulate 
higher wealth in their accounts were also more likely to borrow; these individuals were also 
more likely to have lower financial assets and higher debts and be more credit-constrained.  
Some analysts have explored how borrowing from the pension accounts might affect aggregate 
retirement accumulations. The General Accounting Office (GAO 1997) report mentioned earlier 
suggested that taking loans could result in a loss of retirement wealth; nonetheless, that paper 
assumed a fixed annual rate of return on pension accounts and a fixed borrowing period, neither 
of which is realistic. Reeves and Villarreal (2008) stated that the opportunity cost of borrowing 
$30,000 from one’s pension account could be as high as $600,000, but they assumed that people 
                                                 
1 Other related studies include Choi, Laibson, Madrian and Metrick (2001), Mitchell, Mottola, Utkus and Yamaguchi (2006), 





stopped contributing to their accounts during the repayment period. Whether this is realistic or 
not is unknown. On the other hand, Li and Smith (2008) found that many people carry relatively 
expensive credit card debt, which they argued was puzzling since participants could have 
borrowed from their 401(k) accounts at lower rates. That study also concluded that liquidity-
constrained households are more likely to take 401(k) loans.  
In a related but separate literature, Ayres and Nablebuff (2008) show, using a life cycle 
formulation, that it is optimal for young people to buy stocks on margin. This might provide an 
incentive for younger people to take loans from their pension accounts. Using CEX data on 
vehicle loans, Stephens (2008) found that young people are quite liquidity-constrained; this 
could also motivate taking pension plan loans. 
 In the analysis that follows, and in contrast to most of the previous literature, we 
undertake a participant-level analysis of 401(k) plan borrowing. We first outline a simple 
economic model that illustrates some of the key determinants that affect who and why people 
might borrow from their 401(k) accounts.  We then use a large dataset from Vanguard to 
empirically test a series of hypotheses regarding the determinants of plan loans, the size of the 
loans, and proportion of the account balance borrowed. To differentiate our work from previous 
studies, we look at 401(k) assets not only as retirement saving but also as precautionary saving to 
cover negative income or consumption shocks. We extend Li and Smith (2008)’s work by 
constructing a lifetime utility maximization model and compare the difference between 
borrowing from one’s 401(k) account versus one’s credit card. We integrate a precautionary 
motive in the form of a buffer-stock (Deaton 1991; Carroll 1997; Ludvigson 1999) where 





model’s predictions nicely and are consistent with research predicting a hump-shaped 
consumption profile with age (Gourinchas and Parker 2002; Browning and Crossley 2001).  
 
Borrowing from a 401(k) Plan 
 Suppose a worker is a 401(k) plan participant who receives a demand shock of $ x at time 
0. She has $ 0B  in her 401(k) account which she could borrow at interest rate lr . She could also 
choose to take a credit card loan with interest rate cr . After she makes her choice, there is an 
immediate probability of qP  that she will leave her job.  If she has a 401(k) loan outstanding, she 
will need to either take a credit card loan immediately to repay the 401(k) loan, or default.  In 
period 1, she will have income sw  if she stays at her job, or qw  otherwise. She will need to repay 
her debt if it has not already defaulted. We also assume she can save her income in her 401(k) 
account. Her original employer matches $ sm  for each dollar of contribution; if she changes jobs, 
her new employer will have a match rate of $ qm . At time 2, the participant retires and consumes 
all her saving after paying income tax.  
Suppose that the expected return rate of investment is 
~
1r  in period 1, and 
~
2r  in period 2, 
while the income tax rate is   in both periods. The participant’s problem is to maximize her 
utility of consumption. To analyze this problem in more detail, we first consider the case where 
the participant remains on her job. In this case, she must simply compare the difference in utility 
resulting from taking a 401(k) loan and a credit card loan. If she chooses to take a 401(k) loan, 
her problem is  




u c u c  






~ ~ ~ ~
2 1 2 0 2 2(1 )[(1 )(1 )( ) (1 )(1 ) (1 )(1 ) ]ls l s sc r r B x r r x r m B           ; 
 0 s sB B

  ; 1 0lsc  ; 2 0lsc  ; 0 1  . 
Here 1lsc  and 2lsc are her consumption at time 1 and time 2 if she takes the 401(k) loan and 
remains on the old job; sB  is her contribution to her 401(k) account at time 1, while sB

 is the 
maximum contribution allowed by the plan;   is her discount rate. The participant chooses sB  
to maximize her utility. Of course, here we assume that (1 ) (1 ) 0s lw r x     so that both 1lsc  
and 2lsc will be positive. 
 Conversely, if she chooses to take a credit card loan, her problem is  
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u c u c  




2 1 2 0 2(1 )[(1 )(1 ) (1 )(1 ) ]cs s sc r r B r m B       ; 
 '0 s sB B

  ; 1 0csc  ; 2 0csc  ; 0 1  . 
Here 1csc  and 2csc  are her consumption levels at time 1 and time 2 if she takes the credit card 
loan and remains employed. 'sB  is her contribution to her 401(k) account at time 1.  
 It is easy to show that if sB  and 
'
sB  are not binding, then 
~
1 2 1 2 2'( ) / '( ) '( ) / '( ) (1 )(1 )ls ls cs cs su c u c u c u c r m    , which means that if one option is better 
than another, the participant would be better off in both periods if she chooses the better option. 
The utility difference between taking 401(k) loan and credit card loan is  
* * * *





Next we explore the effects of some key variables on the utility difference. For instance, 
we find 1/ '( ) 0c csloandiff r x u c     , meaning that the advantage of taking the 401(k) loan will 
be larger if the credit card rate is higher. Also 
~
2 2 1/ [ (1 )(1 ) '( ) '( )]l ls lsloandiff r x r u c u c       . 
We already showed that under the non-binding situation, 
~
1 2 2'( ) / '( ) (1 )(1 )ls ls su c u c r m   , 
hence we have 
~
2 2/ (1 ) '( )( ) 0l ls sloandiff r x r u c m        , which means that the advantage 
of taking a 401(k) loan will be larger if the interest rate on the 401(k) loan is lower. If sB  is 
lower bounded, i.e. * 0sB  , then we have 
~
1 2 2'( ) / '( ) (1 )(1 )ls ls su c u c r m   , hence 
/ 0lloandiff r    still holds.  The only possible situation for / 0lloandiff r    is when 
*s sB B

 , i.e. the participant is constrained by the maximum contribution amount. In this case 
she may be better off if the interest rate of the loan is higher; if 
~ ~
1 2 0 2 2 2/ (1 )(1 )[ { '( ) '( )} '( )]ls cs lsloandiff r r B u c u c x u c         , the effect is ambiguous. But 
in the case that 2 2ls csc c , the effect is negative, which suggests that a higher expected 
investment return in the first period reduces the benefit of taking the 401(k) loan. We could 
further argue that even if 2 2ls csc c , the effect could still be negative if the consumption 
difference is relatively small, or the loan amount is relatively large. 
 Next we look at the case where the participant must change jobs just after taking the 
401(k) loan. Note that she can either repay the loan immediately by taking a credit card loan, or 
she can default and pay income tax plus 10 percent penalty tax on the loan amount. Therefore, 





card loan.  If she takes a 401(k) loan, changes job, and defaults on the loan, her problem is 




u c u c  
where   1 (1 )( )lq q qc w B   ; 
  
~ ~ ~
2 1 2 0 2(1 )[(1 )(1 ){ (1.1 ) } (1 )(1 ) ]lq q qc r r B x r m B          ; 
  0 q qB B

  ; 1 0lqc  ; 2 0lqc  ; 0 1  . 
Here, 1lqc  and 2lqc  are her consumptions at time 1 and time 2, while qB  is her contribution to her 
new 401(k) account, and qB

 is the maximum contribution allowed by her new plan. 
 Similarly, if she takes a credit card loan, whether it is before or after her job change, her 
problem is 1 2
'




u c u c  where    
 1 (1 )( ' ) (1 )cq q q cc w B r x     ; 
 
~ ~ ~
2 1 2 0 2(1 )[(1 )(1 ) (1 )(1 ) ' ]cq q qc r r B r m B       ; 
 0 'q qB B

  ; 1 0cqc  ; 2 0cqc  ; 0 1  . 
Here 1cqc  and 2cqc  are consumption at time 1 and time 2, while 'qB  is her contribution to her 
new 401(k) account. 
 Similar to when the participant stays at her job, here we have the utility difference 
between defaulting on a 401(k) loan and taking a credit card loan as:  
* * * *
1 2 1 2( ) ( ) ( ) ( )lq lq cq cqloandiff u c u c u c u c     . With this we can easily derive the following: 
1/ '( ) 0c cqloandiff r x u c     ; and  
~ ~




It is logical that a higher credit card interest rate will discourage people from borrowing and 
instead induce defaulting on the 401(k) loan. The effect of the expected rate of return in the first 
period is the same as discussed in the previous case: that is, a lower expected return would make 
people more likely to default on the 401(k) loans, as the opportunity cost of defaulting is smaller. 
 Now we can derive the complete expected utility difference model as: 
* * * *
1 2 1 2(1 )[ ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )]q lq lq cq cqExpectDiff P u c u c u c u c        
   * * * *1 2 1 2max{ ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ),0}q ls ls cs csP u c u c u c u c     ,  
where qP  is the probability of the participant having to leave her job. Notice that when the 
participant takes a 401(k) loan, even if she leaves her job, she can still choose to take a credit 
card loan to repay the 401(k) loan if it is more attractive than defaulting. Thus as long as the 
participant would be better off taking a 401(k) loan if she stays, her optimal choice is to take it 
without worrying about default.  
From the discussion above, it is clear that a higher credit card interest rate would make 
people tend to take the 401(k) loan. Further, unless the participant is constrained by the 
maximum contribution amount of her 401(k) account, she would be better off by taking 401(k) 
loan if it has a lower interest rate. If she is constrained, the effect of the 401(k) loan interest rate 
could go either way. Another point worth noting is that, if the difference is close, a lower 




 We showed that a higher credit card interest rate and a lower 401(k) loan interest rate would 





interesting that in a study of credit card rates, Gross and Souleles (2002) observe an average 
credit card interest rate of 16 percent, while the average 401(k) loan interest rate is 7.7 percent in 
our sample (about which we say more below). This large difference suggests that people might 
be thought more likely to borrow from their 401(k) accounts than from their credit cards. 
Nevertheless, Li and Smith (2008) report that many households persist in holding large credit 
card debt even when a plan loan would be cheaper. They suggest that financial advisers’ negative 
opinions on taking 401(k) loans, along with peoples’ ‘mental accounting’ mentality, i.e. treating 
401(k) accounts primarily for retirement saving purposes rather than a part of the overall 
household balance sheet, may help explain why people do not make optimal use of 401(k) loans. 
 An additional reason that people might be cautious to take a plan loan is that 401(k) 
assets are only partly liquid. Each 401(k) plan has a minimum loan limit (typically $1,000), and 
the law specifies that the maximum loan is $50,000. More importantly, most plan sponsors allow 
participants to have only one loan outstanding at any time, and very few plans allow them to 
have more than three loans at once. Amromin (2003) suggests that restricted access to tax-
deferred accounts may affect peoples’ portfolio location and allocation decisions. As noted 
above, buffer-stock models predict that sensible borrowers might leave a precautionary buffer 
under the borrowing limit to allow for future consumption shocks, and this prediction is 
confirmed by Gross and Souleles (2002) in the credit card arena. In view of the fact that 401(k) 
borrowers are often constrained by the number of loans they can have at a time, it is thus not 
surprising that people might preserve the option to take a loan in the event of a potential future 
consumption shock. To examine this hypothesis in the 401(k) environment, we will test whether 
participants in 401(k) plans that allow more outstanding loans actually do take more loans, 





 Our model also suggests that higher expected investment returns during the loan period 
would make taking a 401(k) loan more costly. Accordingly, when the economy is doing well and 
expected stock market returns are high, we should expect to see fewer 401(k) loans taken. 
Conversely, in a bear market, the opportunity cost of taking a 401(k) loan and defaulting might 
be lower. Combined with the tightening of credit and high job turnover rate, this might lead to 
more 401(k) loan taking and defaulting.  
 
Empirical Approach 
To test these hypotheses, we use a dataset from Vanguard on 401(k) pension plans with 
four years of participant loan and repayment records for employees covered by 959 different 
plans. Information available includes participant demographic and economic characteristics, 
along with plan characteristics from July 2004 to June 2008, along with a dataset recording all 
loans taken back to the 1980s as well as the loans’ status by end-June 2008. The analysis below 
focuses on active employees during the sample period permitted to take a loan.  
 Although loan interest rates vary by plan, most plans mark the plan borrowing rate to 
prime rate plus 1 percent. In Figure 1, we report the median loan interest rate in our sample 
compared to the prime rate over our period, and it is clear that the median loan interest rate 
tracks the prime rate very closely.   
Figure 1 here  
The average loan amount held during the sample period is slightly more than $8,300. The 
median loan amount, though, is only $5,000, showing that most are borrowing a relatively small 
amount of assets from their pension accounts. Figure 2 shows the distribution of loans over the 




Figure 2 here 
 Participants with less than $100,000 accumulated in their pension accounts can take a 
maximum of 50 percent of the account balance; the distribution is depicted in Figure 3. Virtually 
no one exploits the entire loan, and most of the time people take less than 20 percent of what 
they are permitted to take. Figure 4 shows what people borrow if they have accumulated 
$100,000 or more and can only borrow up to $50,000; only about 6-7 percent of borrowers eligible 
to take the maximum do so in any month.   
Figures 3 and 4 here 
 Under the law, a regular plan loan must be repaid within five years. But participants may 
also take a principal residence loan to use for purchasing a home with a longer loan period, of 
between 15 - 30 years (depending on the plan). About 4 percent of all loans in our sample are 
principal residence loans, and as Figure 5 indicates, there is some seasonality in residential loans: 
the percentage is typically higher in spring and summer months, and it takes a dip during winter. 
Figure 5 here  
 Most plans charge annual maintenance fees when people take a loan. As long as the loan 
has not been fully repaid, the fee is generally charged annually. While the highest fee charged in 
our record is $45 per year, the average annual fee is about $18, a level that remains virtually 
unchanged during the period. Considering that the average loan amount is more than $8,000, the 
annual fee is a relatively small cost. 
Testable Hypotheses on Having a Loan.  From the model, we hypothesize that people who are 
liquidity constrained are more likely to take 401(k) loans. Inasmuch as low-income people are 
more likely to be liquidity constrained (Gross and Souleles, 2002), we anticipate that lower-paid 





effect on borrowing from the pension for several reasons. Love (2006, 2007) predicts that 
younger people who anticipate borrowing from their 401(k) plans in the future should boost their 
contributions, leading to higher balances; in this case, participants having higher balances would 
also be more likely to take a loan (controlling on other factors). To the extent that the typical life-
cycle consumption profile is hump-shaped, peaking between 45 and 55 years of age (Gourinchas 
and Parker 2002; Browning and Crossley 2001), we would anticipate that people would have 
higher consumption needs during middle-age. Therefore controlling on other factors, we should 
see a middle-aged rise in 401(k) borrowing and level of loans outstanding. Holding constant age, 
longer plan tenure is likely to make the participant understand her plan better and hence be more 
likely to have a loan. 
The empirical analysis also includes other participant-side factors including non-
retirement wealth, to control on other assets available to the borrower. This is measured as the 
total nonretirement financial wealth by participant zipcode (IXI wealth2). We also know whether 
the participants’ assets in the account result from contributions on the present job or are funds 
rolled over from a prior job. It is possible that participants might consider the rollover funds to be 
more their “own” money than accruals on a new job, in which case having rollover accounts 
might be positively associated with loan taking.  
Several firm-side and plan-level effects are also evaluated. For instance, financial literacy 
could be important in boosting loan probabilities, and this may be more widespread among 
financial sector employees and workers in larger firms. People may be more cautious in 
industries and occupations with higher turnover rates. Plan features may also be important in 
anticipated ways. For instance, above we showed that lower plan interest rates would be 
                                                 
2 IXI wealth code is generated by the IXI Corporation as a categorical measurement of household non-retirement financial assets 
based on zip code. We collapsed the original wealth classes into three groups: Poor (wealth<$7,280), Medium ($7,280 to 





expected to make borrowing more attractive; we predict more loans when plan interest rates are 
lower. We also argued that people may seek to maintain a precautionary buffer given a certain 
number of loans they are permitted to have. For this reason we examine whether allowing people 
to take only one loan versus more, makes them more cautious. 
Testable Hypotheses on Loan Size. Given that someone takes a loan, the participant with a 
larger account balance should be able to take out a larger loan. While this should hold in general, 
we must take into account the fact that there is a legal cap of half the balance or $50,000. 
Holding other factors constant, people with higher incomes will have higher expected lifetime 
incomes and therefore can afford to take out larger loans. Workers in plans that allow multiple 
loans may take smaller loans so as to preserve the precautionary buffer for the future. Age is 
likely to have a mixed impact, in that younger people are likely to have poorer credit histories 
and be more liquidity-constrained. On the other hand, since the lifecycle consumption profile is 
believed to be hump-shaped, it is also possible that middle-aged participants have higher 
consumption needs and so take bigger loans. 
 Participants with account balances less than $100,000 are allowed to borrow up to 50 
percent of their assets, while those with balances over $100,000 will be constrained by the 
$50,000 cap. We hypothesize that among the first group, people with lower account balances and 
lower household income are more likely to be constrained by the 50 percent cap. On the other 
hand, among those with account balances greater than $100,000, we hypothesize that people with 
larger account balances are more likely to be constrained by the $50,000 cap. Other factors 
should have the same effect on the fraction of the available loan taken, as on the size of the loan. 
 




Plan Borrowing. To explore the characteristics of those who borrow from their pensions, we use 
a multivariate logistic regression model as follows:  
, , , ,Pr( 1| , ) ( ' ' )i j t i j i j i j t i j tLoan X Z F X Z             
where ( ) 1/ (1 exp( ))F x x   and , ,i j tLoan  is set to 1 if the participant has a loan outstanding in 
period t. The vector iX  refers to employee characteristics including age, sex, tenure, wage, and 
household wealth. The vector jZ  represents plan characteristics such as plan loan interest rate 
and number of outstanding loans allowed. We control for firm characteristics, including number 
of participants, plan average age, tenure and income, as well as industry. 3 We also use the prime 
rate as an instrument to control for outside borrowing costs, and month dummies to control for 
seasonality. 
 We analyze the sample of 959 plans managed by Vanguard which allow loans, covering 
more than 2.3 million active participants during July 2004 - June 2008. Sample means of the 
independent variables appear in Column 1 of Table 1, while Column 1 of Table 2 shows 
marginal effects from Logit multivariate regressions. The probability of having a loan 
outstanding in any given month is about 19 percent, and as hypothesized, people with lower 
household income and lower non-retirement financial wealth whom we deem likely to be 
liquidity-constrained, are more prone to have 401(k) loans outstanding. We also find that people 
with lower account balances are more likely to have loans, and women are almost 1 percent more 
likely to have a loan outstanding than are men. Middle-age participants are more likely to have 
plan loans compared to their younger and older peers. Thus, holding other factors constant, those 
younger than age 25 are 6.7 percent less likely to have a loan compared to those age 35-45; 
                                                 
3 We have run these regressions while clustering at the plan level instead of controlling for firm 






people over age 55 are 6.6 percent less likely to have a loan. New hires, with fewer than two 
years of tenure, are 21.3 percent less likely to have a loan compared to those who have been in 
the plan for over eight years, while being web-registered makes one 6.8 percent more likely to 
have a loan, holding constant other factors. People who have rollover funds in their accounts are 
also more likely to take loans.  
Tables 1 and 2 here 
 It is also interesting that participants in plans which permit multiple loans are more likely 
to have loans, consistent with predictions. We had also hypothesized that workers may retain a 
precautionary buffer given the number of plan loans allowed, and the empirical results are 
supportive: if the sponsor allows one more loan, this boosts loan probabilities by 1.6 percent.  
Further, lower loan interest rates are associated with more loans though the effect is relatively 
small: a 1 percentage point lower plan loan interest rate increases the probability of having a loan 
by only 0.3 percent.  
 Next we explore the characteristics of those who take a new loan, given that they are 
eligible to borrow from their accounts. Now the dependent variable indicates the probability that 
an eligible participant takes a new loan in month t. For a participant to be eligible to take a plan 
loan in a given month, she must have plan assets at least two times the minimum loan amount set 
by the plan; and not have already borrowed to the plan limit (in dollars and number of loans 
permitted). Column 2 of Table 1 provides variable means while Column 2 of Table 2 reports 
Logit marginal effects. Most factors have similar effects as above, though the magnitudes are 
much smaller since the probability of taking a new loan in a particular month is only 1.2 percent. 
Here the effect of the plan’s interest rate on loans is not statistically significant. This may be 




now at the cost of some accumulated retirement assets. And since plan loan interest rates are 
typically much lower than credit card rates, even if they do rise a bit, they are still well below 
rates on credit card loans. Additionally, some fraction of 401(k) borrowers may be undertaking a 
loan in an emergency, which could lead them to pay less attention to interest rates. 
 Accordingly, the empirical results largely support our hypotheses. Using household 
income and non-retirement financial wealth to indicate who is more liquidity-constrained, we 
find that the constrained subset is also more likely to tap into their 401(k) accounts using loans. 
Middle aged people (age 35-45) are also more likely to have 401(k) loans, consistent with 
previous empirical findings that a typical lifecycle consumption profile shows a hump during 
middle age. When more loans are permitted, people also take more loans, consistent with the 
precautionary motive prediction of buffer-stock models.  
Loan Amounts. Next we examine the factors affecting loan amounts, focusing only on the 
subset of people who take a loan in each month.4  Besides the IRS regulation, plans may have 
their own more restrictive rules on how much one can borrow. To address this concern, we 
eliminate 41 plans that do not have any participant taking up to the 50% limit during the sample 
period. Column 3 of Table 1 reports sample means of independent variables and Table 3 shows 
OLS regression results where plan loan amounts are measured in natural logs. Here we see that 
middle-aged people are more likely to take larger loans, consistent with the hump-shaped 
lifetime consumption profile noted above. Plan tenure and web registration also have the same 
positive effects on loan size and proportion as they have on who has loans outstanding. It is 
interesting that, although women were more likely to have a loan in the prior table, men take 
larger loans, all else equal. The better off -- those with more non-retirement financial assets and 
                                                 





income -- are more likely to take larger loans. Previously we showed  that these people are less 
likely to have a loan outstanding since they have more alternatives, so it is interesting that, 
conditional on taking a loan, they borrow more, perhaps because they can more readily repay the 
loan early in case of job change. As hypothesized, people with higher account balances take out 
higher loan amounts, which makes sense since those with higher balance have higher loan limits.  
Lower interest rates appear to boost the size of loans taken, though the effect is quite small. If a 
plan permits more loans, this reduces the size of each loan, supportive of the buffer stock view.  
Table 3 here 
Another interesting question is who is constrained by the legal cap on loans. Table 4 
examines the factors influencing whether people take the largest loan they can; column 1 
examines people who hit any plan maximum, while column 2 refers to the 50 percent asset cap, 
and column 3 refers to the $50,000 cap.  Once again we see the the middle-age hump pattern: 
other factors constant, those age 35-44 are 3.8 percentage points more likely to be constrained by 
some cap than persons younger than age 25. Younger people are also less constrained by the 
money cap than the percentage cap. Men are 1.8 percentage points more likely to hit the cap than 
women, more due to the percentage than the dollar limit. Those with higher income and more 
non-retirement financial assets are more likely to hit a cap: thus someone with over $61,300 in 
non-retirement assets (people with high IXI wealth) is 3.6 percentage points more likely to take a 
maximum allowable loan, compared to someone with low non-retirement assets. The dollar limit 
is more likely to restrict higher earners and those with more nonfinancial assets, and 
unsurprisingly, those with lower account balances are more likely to be constrained by their 





hitting the loan cap by 9.4 percentage points. Loan interest rates appear to be positively related to 
taking the maximum, but the effect is quite small.   
Table 4 here 
  
Discussion and Conclusion 
 This paper shows that 401(k) plans can be seen not only as a vehicle for retirement saving 
but also as a medium for precautionary saving that can help protect against income or 
consumption shocks. Our utility maximization model suggests that several factors will affect 
peoples’ 401(k) loan demand, including liquidity constraints, plan interest rates, and plan 
features. Some find it puzzling that people do not seem to use 401(k) loans to repay more 
expensive outside debt, but we argue that people may wish to preserve a precautionary buffer for 
loans. We therefore predict that plans which allow multiple loans will see their participants take 
more loans. 
 Evidence on these hypotheses is provided using a Vanguard dataset on loan behavior in 
almost 1,000 employer 401(k) plans. While higher plan interest rates are associated with fewer 
loans, the effect is small: a one percentage point higher borrowing rate is associated with only a 
0.3 percentage point lower probability of having a plan loan. Loan amounts are also fairly 
insensitive to interest rates, in that a one percentage point rise in the rate only decreases the size 
of the loan by 0.4 percentage points. Evidently plan participants are not particularly responsive to 
borrowing costs. On the other hand, there is strong evidence of the buffer-stock aspect of plan 
loans: when a sponsor permits one additional loan, loan participation rises by 1.6 percentage 





We also detect a hump-shaped age profile among borrowers, where those age 35-45 are 
more likely to borrow -- and when they do, are more likely to take the maximum -- as compared 
to their younger and older counterparts.  And using household income and non-retirement 
financial wealth to indicate who is more liquidity-constrained, we find that the constrained subset 
is also more likely to tap into its 401(k) accounts with loans. Yet those with more non-retirement 
financial assets and income take larger loans, more often at the legal limit. In sum, some plan 
borrowing is evidently driven by liquidity needs, while another portion is consistent with a 
rational life-cycle approach to retirement saving.  
 Future work will further explore the impact of macroeconomic factors on plan loans and 
defaults on 401(k) plan loans.  Our model would predict that in a bear market, taking a 401(k) 
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Mean of  
Active Participants
Mean of  
Active Participants 
Eligible to take a 
Loan 
Mean of  
Active Participants 
who take a loan 
Age (Year) 43.5 44.5 41.2 
Age <25 (%) 0.03 0.02 0.03 
Age 25-35 (%) 0.2 0.18 0.25 
Age 35-45 (%) 0.28 0.28 0.34 
Age 45-55 (%) 0.31 0.32 0.29 
Age ≥55 (%) 0.17 0.19 0.1 
Web Registered 0.57 0.60 0.71 
Plan Tenure (Years) 7.99 8.55 7.76 
Male 0.48 0.51 0.44 
Ln Household Income ($) 11.12 11.18 11 
Low IXI Wealth Index (%) 0.46 0.42 0.61 
Medium IXI Wealth Index (%) 0.32 0.33 0.29 
High IXI Wealth Index (%) 0.22 0.25 0.1 
Account Balance ($) 78,548 93,561 48,448 
# Plan Participants/1000 17.0 17.2 18 
Rollover Flag (%) 0.10 0.12 0.09 
Loan Interest Rate (%) 7.70 7.69 7.56 











Note: This table reports mean sample characteristics. Column 1 shows means for all active participants of 
959 plans (July 2004-June 2008); Column 2 shows means for those are eligible to take a 401(k) loan at a 
given month during the same period. Column 3 shows means for all active participants of the larger set of 
918 plans who took a loan in each month during the period. Web registered is set to 1 if a participant has 
web access to her account, and 0 otherwise; plan tenure measures the period of time since the participant 
has joined the plan; household income index is a categorical variable that measures annual household 
income. IXI wealth codes are used to indicate wealth bands where Low IXI wealth is set to 1 if the 
household non-retirement wealth is <$7,280, Medium IXI wealth is set to 1 if the household non-
retirement wealth lies between $7,280 and $61,289, and High IXI wealth is set to 1 if the household non-
retirement wealth is >$61,289; Account balance refers to the dollar value of assets accumulated in the 
participant’s retirement account; number of participants denotes the average number of participants in 
each plan divided by 1,000. Rollover flag is set to 1 if the participant has rollover funds from her previous 
retirement account in her current account; the loan interest rate is the interest rate applied to borrowing 
from the 401(k) plan; and number of loans allowed is the average number of loans taken by a participant 




Table 2. Multinomial Logit Determinants of the Probability of Having a Loan Outstanding 






 Who has an outstanding loan? Who takes a loan? 
Age <25 (%) -0.0666*** -0.0017*** 
Age 25-35 (%) -0.0180*** -0.0008*** 
Age 45-55 (%) -0.0163*** -0.0011*** 
Age ≥55 (%) -0.0660*** -0.0039*** 
Male -0.0089*** -0.0007*** 
Plan tenure<2 years -0.2131*** -0.0053*** 
2 years≤plan tenure<4 years -0.1286*** -0.0027*** 
4 years≤plan tenure<6 years -0.0708*** -0.0011*** 
6 years≤plan tenure<8 years -0.0378*** -0.0005*** 
HHIncomeIndex<45,000 0.0732*** 0.0042*** 
45,000≤HHIncomeIndex<87,500 0.0385*** 0.0019*** 
Ln Account balance -0.0032*** -0.0005*** 
Medium IXI wealth (%) -0.0586*** -0.0032*** 
High IXI wealth (%) -0.1081*** -0.0057*** 
Web registered 0.0683*** 0.0047*** 
Rollover flag (%) 0.0018*** -0.0007*** 
# loans allowed 0.0162*** 0.0016*** 
Loan interest rate (%) -0.0029*** 0.0000 
# Observations 62,141,010 46,207,312 
Mean of Dependent Variable 0.1890 0.0121 
R-squared 0.4212 0.7181 
 
Note: This table reports marginal effects from a multinomial Logit regression model. Column 1 shows the 
effects on the probability of having a loan in a given month, equal to 1 if the participant has a loan 
outstanding at month t, and 0 otherwise. Column 2 shows the effects on the probability of taking a loan in 
a given month. Marginal effects of Ln Account balance, Number of loans allowed, and Loan interest rate 
refer to a change in the dependent variable if, respectively, the person’s balance increased by $10,000; the 
number of loans allowed increased by 1; or the loan interest rate increased by 1 percentage point. We use 
the 35-45 age group as the reference age; the ≥8 years tenure group as the reference tenure; the ≥$87,500 
household income group as the reference; Low IXI wealth for reference wealth. The natural log of the 
account balances is used; if the account balance is less than $1, the log account balance is set to 0. Models 
also control for firm-side average characteristics, industry, month, prime rate, and missing values of 











Who takes a large loan? 
Age <25 (%) -0.1823*** 
Age 25-35 (%) -0.0494*** 
Age 45-55 (%) -0.0515*** 
Age ≥55 (%) -0.1234*** 
Male 0.0336*** 
Plan tenure<2 years -0.0721*** 
2 years≤plan tenure<4 years -0.0336*** 
4 years≤plan tenure<6 years 0.0444*** 
6 years≤plan tenure<8 years 0.0710*** 
HHIncomeIndex<45,000 -0.0663*** 
45,000≤HHIncomeIndex<87,500 -0.0306*** 
Ln Account balance 0.6091*** 
Medium IXI wealth (%) 0.0317*** 
High IXI wealth (%) 0.0722*** 
Web registered 0.0861*** 
Rollover flag (%) 0.0049 
# loans allowed -0.1589*** 
Loan interest rate (%) 0.0155*** 
# Observations 537,316 
Mean of Dependent Variable 8.52 
R-squared 0.6211 
 
Note: The dependent variable is the natural log of the dollar amount borrowed, set to 0 if loan amount is 






Table 4. Determinants of the Probability of Taking a Maximum Loan (OLS Coefficients) 
 
Variable 
      
Loan at Either Cap Loan at  Loan at $50K Cap 
  50% Cap   
Age <25 (%) -0.0377*** -0.0499*** -0.0718*** 
Age 25-35 (%) -0.0089*** -0.0125*** 0.0317*** 
Age 45-55 (%) -0.0034*** -0.0075*** -0.0268*** 
Age ≥55 (%) -0.0073*** -0.0237*** -0.0208*** 
Male 0.0177*** 0.0164*** 0.0077*** 
Plan tenure<2 years -0.0177*** -0.0395*** 0.0789*** 
2 years≤plan tenure<4 years -0.0626*** -0.0689*** 0.0345** 
4 years≤plan tenure<6 years -0.0329*** -0.0298*** 0.0397*** 
6 years≤plan tenure<8 years -0.0177*** -0.0115*** 0.0398*** 
HHIncomeIndex<45,000 -0.0247*** -0.0257*** -0.0078*** 
45,000≤HHIncomeIndex<87,500 -0.0200*** -0.0154*** -0.0128*** 
Ln Account balance -0.0832*** -0.1082*** 0.0595*** 
Medium IXI wealth (%) 0.0080*** 0.0076*** 0.0095*** 
High IXI wealth (%) 0.0357*** 0.0196*** 0.0450*** 
Web registered 0.0219*** 0.0244*** 0.0053** 
Rollover flag (%) -0.0003 -0.0019 0.0096*** 
# loans allowed -0.0936*** -0.1031*** -0.0372*** 
Loan interest rate (%) 0.0066*** 0.0098*** -0.0007 
# Observations 537,316 469,556 67,760 
Mean of Dependent Variable 0.1687 0,1832 0.0687 
R-squared 0.1254 0.1366 0.0585 
 
Note: The dependent variable in Column 1 is the probability of a loan being constrained, equal to 1 if the 
loan hits either the 50% of balance or $50,000 cap. Column 2 examines the probability of a loan being 
constrained by only the 50% cap and Column 3 refers to a loan being constrained by the $50,000 cap. For 






Figure 1. Plot of Median Loan Interest Rates versus Prime Rate  
 
 
Note: Median Loan Interest Rate in Red, Prime Rate in Blue 
 
 





















Figure 5.  Percentage of Principal Residence Loans   
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